

# INTL 8230: International Conflict

## University of Georgia, Department of International Affairs

### *Course Instructor Information:*

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Office Hours: Weds, 1:30-3:30pm  
(or by appointment)

### *Course Meeting Information:*

Fall 2016  
Tuesdays, 12:30-3:15pm  
117 Candler Hall  
<https://www.elc.uga.edu>

### **Course Description:**

Why do actors go to war? This question has captivated the attention of politicians, philosophers, scholars, and citizens for centuries, and there is therefore no shortage of proposed answers to it. In this course, we examine many of these answers from a social scientific perspective. Towards this end, the course proceeds in three phases. First, we begin by grounding ourselves in a research tradition that examines international events through a scientific process – one that builds and evaluates theoretical and empirical models and constantly questions and assesses its own purpose. Second, we review conceptual definitions of conflict episodes (war, militarized conflict, crises, and rivalry), as well as the larger trends in these episodes over time. Finally, we examine the many factors that theoretically might lead to (a lack of) militarized conflict across numerous levels of analysis, including the systemic, dyadic, national, and individual levels. Our primary goal will be to dissect and analyze these various theoretical explanations. In the process, we will consider what conflict scholars do (i.e., theory construction), how they do it (i.e., research design and methods), what problems they face, and what they can do better.

### **Caveats:**

Two points require clarification at the outset of the course. First, this is not a course on *conflict management*, *comparative political violence* (i.e., *civil war*), or *human rights*. This course is therefore not a substitute for those – although there will be some theoretical overlap between these various courses and this one. Second, this course is *not* a policy course. We will therefore not be writing policy briefs on current conflicts or other similar exercises. Rather, we will focus on understanding how scholars approach the study of international conflict, paying particular attention to the various theoretical explanations they advance for why conflict occurs. That said, these explanations undoubtedly have policy implications, and we will discuss those. Ultimately, understanding *why* conflict occurs (our goal) might help us better understand the world in which policy-makers find themselves and what they can or cannot do in pursuit of their foreign policy goals.

### **Course Objectives:**

At the conclusion of this course, students should be able to:

- Identify and explain the various theoretical explanations for why international conflict occurs;
- Construct a theoretical argument and present it in oral and written form;
- Evaluate the merits of theoretical arguments using clearly specified criteria, articulating both the criteria used and criticisms of the arguments; and
- Appreciate how scholars of international conflict conduct their work.

### Course Reading Material:

We will read large sections of the following books, and I therefore encourage you to purchase them. If the library owns a copy of these books, I have also put them on reserve at the library:

- Blainey, Geoffrey. (1988) *The Causes of War*. New York: Free Press.
- Braumoeller, Bear F. (2013) *Great Powers and the International System*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Clark, Kevin A., and David M. Primo. (2012) *A Model Discipline*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Most, Benjamin A., and Harvey Starr. (1989) *Inquiry, Logic, and International Politics*. Columbia: South Carolina University Press.
- Rosen, Stephen P. (2005) *War and Human Nature*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Vasquez, John A. (2009) *The War Puzzle Revisited*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Vasquez, John A., ed. (2012) *What Do We Know about Interstate War?*, 2<sup>nd</sup> edn. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield.

The following books are good supplemental texts, although we will not read and cover them in the classroom. You therefore need not purchase them for the purposes of this course:

- Cashman, Greg. (2014) *Causes of War?*, 2<sup>nd</sup> edn. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield.
- Levy, Jack S., and William R. Thompson. (2010) *Causes of War*. West Sussex: Wiley-Blackwell.
- Midlarsky, Manus I., ed. (2000) *Handbook of War Studies II*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan.
- Mitchell, Sara McLaughlin, and John A. Vasquez, eds. (2014) *Conflict, War, and Peace: An Introduction to Scientific Research*. Los Angeles: Sage.
- Mitchell, Sara McLaughlin, Paul F. Diehl, and James D. Morrow, eds. (2012) *Guide to the Scientific Study of International Processes*. West Sussex: Wiley-Blackwell.

The remaining readings will come from two sources: academic journals in the field and book chapters (from books not listed above). All required readings (beyond the first list of books noted above) will be made available electronically from the instructor. They can be accessed through the course eLearning Commons (eLC) website (log-in using UGA MyID at: <https://uga.view.usg.edu/>). If you do not find something on the course website, please access the material through the University of Georgia Library system and/or notify me.

### Course Requirements:

#### *Participation (20% of final grade)*

As with any graduate course, attendance and participation are critical and required. My goal is to have you directly engage the course material, rather than passively hear about it. Therefore, I will conduct each class meeting as an open-ended discussion of the material assigned for that day, rather than a traditional lecture. Students should prepare for class by reading the assigned material (before we meet), prepare any assignments listed for the week (if any), and actively contribute to the discussion in class. I will grade participation based on the following factors: (a) attendance, (b) frequency with which a student participates in discussion (i.e., quantity), (c) extent to which student comments contribute positively to the discussion (i.e., quality), (d) the extent to which a student identifies key points and raises appropriate questions, and (e) the extent to which comments demonstrate that the student has thought about and processed the readings. Appropriate questions include those that critique, extend, or request clarification of readings, as well as those that connect various readings to one another.

(Note: During our discussions in the classroom, students may be called upon randomly using a lottery system in which I sample with replacement. I therefore encourage students to be prepared for our meetings.)

*Models (15% for the first turned in, 20% each for the second and third):*

Throughout the semester, students will write three (3) short papers (approximately 5-7 pages each) that: a) identify and summarize a model from our readings that explains why international conflict does or does not occur, b) situates the model within other works/research that we have covered, c) critiques the model, and d) offers some indication of how the model might be tested. For our purposes, a model consists of a specified relationship between an independent variable (X) and a dependent variable (Y), explained by theoretical logic.

A few guidelines:

- Be concise and clear in the presentation of your model. Ensure that you cover all the theoretical logic that connects the key independent variable to the key dependent variable.
- The discussion of possible model testing should not merely reiterate what the readings did. Rather, it should search for ways to evaluate, *inter alia*: a) further implications of the model (i.e., what has not yet been tested, but is consistent with the model's logic), b) model adjustments in light of criticisms raised (i.e., tests that shed light on the value of criticisms and whether the model holds up to them), or c) the merits of the model relative to other models (i.e., a way to distinguish the model's predictions from other models).
- Students may not work together on these assignments and will sign up for topics in class. One student can work on any given topic, and these are assigned on a first-come first-served basis.
- Papers are due on or before the day that we cover the paper's model in class. Because of this (and because there are three papers to write), students are encouraged to *not* wait until the end of the semester to write their papers.
- Students will present their model(s) to the class as part of our class discussion. This presentation will be part of your assignment grade.

Writing Resources:

Whether you plan for a job in academia or the public or private sphere, writing is an essential skill. We all need practice and help to improve our writing. The above assignments supply one form of practice, and my feedback on them should offer you advice on how to improve. Beyond this advice, I find that the following resources have helped me, my colleagues, or my students improve their writing. These resources are not available on the course website (for copyright reasons).

- Zinsser, William. 2006. *On Writing Well*. New York: HarperCollins.
- Strunk, William, and E.B. White. 2000. *The Elements of Style*. New York: Longman.
- Becker, Howard S. 1986. *Writing for Social Scientists*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Lamott, Anne. 1995. *Bird by Bird: Some Instructions on Writing and Life*. New York: Anchor.

*Final Exam (25% of final grade):*

The course will conclude with a mock comprehensive exam. The exam itself will consist of 1-2 questions and amount to about 8-10 pages of writing. It will draw on material covered throughout the entire semester. I will distribute this exam in class on Tuesday, November 29, 2016. Students will turn in a hard-copy of the exam to the instructor by 5:00pm on Friday, December 9.

*Special Events:*

Throughout the semester, the department, school, and university will have special lectures and presentations. I encourage students to attend these events and will keep students aware of such opportunities. They generally will be advertised via the SPIA graduate student listserv.

### Course Policies:

We will abide by two general policies throughout this course. First, as a University of Georgia student, you have agreed to follow the University's academic honesty policy ("A Culture of Honesty") and the Student Honor Code. All academic work must meet the standards contained in "A Culture of Honesty" (including policies that cover plagiarism; for more information, see: <http://www.uga.edu/honesty>). Students are responsible for informing themselves about these standards before performing *any* academic work and may direct any questions they have regarding the policy (or its application to course assignments) to the instructor.

Second, it should go without saying that we will treat everyone in the class (and their comments) with respect. It is normal to disagree in an academic setting. In fact, many of the scholars that we will read regularly disagree with one another. This disagreement, however, can (and must) occur respectfully. Furthermore, it is normal to make mistakes in the classroom, especially with this challenging material. Therefore, towards the goal of creating a respectful classroom environment, students are expected to: (a) use language that does not insult others or their point of view, (b) keep cell phones turned off *and* put away during class meetings, and (c) use laptops brought to the classroom for educational purposes *only*. Any student that does not follow these guidelines may be asked to leave the classroom. For more information, please see the University of Georgia's Code of Conduct ([http://www.uga.edu/judicialprograms/code\\_of\\_conduct/codeofconduct.pdf](http://www.uga.edu/judicialprograms/code_of_conduct/codeofconduct.pdf)) and its Non-Discrimination and Anti-Harassment Policy (<http://www.uga.edu/eoo/pdfs/NDAH.pdf>).

Note also that it is the policy and practice of the University of Georgia to create an inclusive learning environment. Students requiring accommodations should discuss such matters with the instructor at the outset of the course. Students requesting accommodations must register with the Disability Resource Center on campus (706-542-8719, <http://www.drc.uga.edu>).

### Course Schedule:

The following pages contain a general plan for the course; deviations announced to the class by the instructor may be necessary.

#### I. Week 1: Course Introduction – August 16

- Walt, Stephen M. (1998) International Relations: One World, Many Theories. *Foreign Policy* 110:29-46.
- Lake, David A. (2013) Theory Is Dead, Long Live Theory: The End of the Great Debates and the Rise of Eclecticism in International Relations. *European Journal of International Relations* 19(3):567-587.
- Zinnes, Dina A. (1980) Three Puzzles in Search of a Researcher. *International Studies Quarterly* 24(3):315-342.
- Souva, Mark. (2007) Fostering Theoretical Thinking in Undergraduate Classes. *PS: Political Science & Politics*. 40(3):557-561.
- Powell, Emilia. (2015) Islamic Law States and Peaceful Resolution of Territorial Disputes. *International Organization* 69(4):777-807.
- Levy, Jack S. (2012) The "Paths to War" Concept. In Vasquez, John (2012).

*Activity:* Puzzles.

*Recommended:*

- Enterline, Andrew J. (2007) A Guide to Writing Research Projects in Graduate Political Science Courses.
- Stimson, James. (n.d.) Professional Writing in Political Science: A Highly Opinionated Essay.

## II. Week 2: The Scientific Study of International Processes (SSIP) – August 23

- Clark and Primo, Chapter 2.
- Most and Starr, Chapters 2-3.
- Goertz, Gary, and James Mahoney. (2012) *A Tale of Two Cultures: Qualitative and Quantitative Research in the Social Sciences*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, Ch. 5-6.
- Vasquez, John A. (1995) The Post-Positivist Debate: Reconstructing Scientific Enquiry and International Relations Theory After Enlightenment's Fall. In *International Relations Theory Today*, edited by Ken Booth, and Steve Smith, 217-40. University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press.
- Mearsheimer, John J., and Stephen M. Walt. (2013) Leaving Theory Behind: Why Simplistic Hypothesis Testing Is Bad for International Relations. *European Journal of International Relations*. 19(3):427-457.

*Assignment:* 1. Find a puzzle (of any kind). 2. How should we evaluate theories?

*Recommended:*

- Kadera, Kelly M., and Dina Zinnes. (2012) The Origins and Evolution of SSIP. In Mitchell et al., Chapter 1.
- Hensel, Paul R. (2012) Review of Available Data Sets. In Mitchell et al., Chapter 3.

## III. Week 3: Theoretical Models – August 30

- Clark and Primo, Chapters 3-5.
- Blainey, Geoffrey, All.

*Assignment:* Identify and describe Blainey's theoretical model(s) for the occurrence of war.

## IV. Concepts and Foundations

### a. Week 4: Conceptualizing Interstate Conflict – September 6

- Vasquez, John (2009), Chapters 1-2.
- Most and Starr, Chapter 4.
- Wagner, R. Harrison. (2007) *War and the State*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, Chapter 3.
- Palmer, Glenn, Vito D'Orazio, Michael Kenwick, and Matthew Lane (2015) The MID4 Dataset, 2002-2010: Procedures, Coding Rules, and Description. *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 32(2):222-242.
- Hewitt, J. Joseph. (2003) Dyadic Processes and International Crises. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 47(5):669-692.
- Colaresi, Michael P., Karen Rasler, and William R. Thompson. (2007). *Strategic Rivalries in World Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, Chapter 2.

*Assignment:* Are there international conflicts *not* captured by the readings? If so, what are they?

*Recommended:*

- Levy, Jack S. (1988) Analytic Problems in the Identification of War. *International Interactions* 14(2):181-186.

- Sarkees, Meredith R., and Frank W. Wayman, eds. (2010) *Resort to War*. Washington, DC: CQ Press.
- Vasquez, John A., and Brandon Valeriano. (2010) Classification of Interstate Wars. *Journal of Politics* 72(2):292-309.

**b. Week 5: Conflict Trends and Foundational Empirical Analyses – September 13**

- Pinker, Steven. (2011) *The Better Angels of Our Nature: Why Violence Has Declined*. New York: Viking, Chapter 5.
- Gat, Azar. (2013) Is War Declining – and Why? *Journal of Peace Research* 50(2):149-157.
- Hensel, Paul R. (2002) The More Things Change...: Recognizing and Responding to Trends in Armed Conflict. *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 19(1):27-52.
- Themner, Lotta, and Peter Wallensteen. (2014) Armed Conflicts, 1946-2013. *Journal of Peace Research* 51(4):541-554.
- Houweling, Henk W., and Jan G. Siccama. (1985) The Epidemiology of War, 1816-1980. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 29(4):641-663.
- Bremer, Stuart A. (1992) Dangerous Dyads: Conditions Affecting the Likelihood of Interstate War, 1816-1965. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 36(2):309-341.
- Maoz, Zeev. (2004) Pacifism and Fightaholism in International Politics: A Structural History of National and Dyadic Conflict, 1816-1992. *International Studies Review* 6(4):107-134.

**V. Week 6: Systemic Theories of Conflict – September 20**

- Braumoeller, All (focus particularly on chapters 2-5).
- Tilly, Charles. (1992) *Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990-1992*. Cambridge: Blackwell, Chapter 3.
- Lake, David A. (2009) *Hierarchy in International Relations*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, Chapter 2.

*Recommended:*

- Bull, Hedley. (1977) *The Anarchical Society*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Mearsheimer, John J. (2014) *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*. New York: W.W. Norton.
- Rasler, Karen, and William R. Thompson. (2012) War Making and State Making: How and Where Does It Fit in the Bigger Picture? In Vasquez, John (2012).
- Waltz, Kenneth N. (1979) *Theory of International Politics*. Boston: McGraw Hill.

**VI. Dyadic Theories of Conflict**

**a. Week 7: Polarity and Power – September 27**

- Modelski, George. (1987) *Long Cycles in World Politics*. Seattle: University of Washington Press, Chapter 5 (Chapter 1 optional).
- Organski, A.F.K., and Jacek Kugler. (1980) *The War Ledger*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, Chapter 1.
- Gilpin, Robert. (1988) The Theory of Hegemonic War. *Journal of Interdisciplinary History* 18(4):591-613.
- Copeland, Dale C. (2000) *The Origins of Major War*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, pp. 15-20, 23-28, and Chapter 2.

- Lemke, Douglas. (2002) *Regions of War and Peace*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, Chapter 3.
- Most and Starr, Chapter 6.
- Lebow, Richard N., and Benjamin Valentino. (2009) Lost in Transition: A Critical Analysis of Power Transition Theory. *International Relations* 23(3):389-410.

*Recommended:*

- De Soysa, Indra, John R. Oneal, and Yong-Hee Park. (1997) Testing Power Transition Theory Using Alternative Measures of National Capabilities. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 41(4):509-528.
- DiCicco, Jonathan M., and Jack S. Levy. (1999) Power Shifts and Problem Shifts: The Evolution of the Power Transition Research Program. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 43(6):675-704.
- Doran, Charles F. (1983) War and Power Dynamics. *International Studies Quarterly* 27(4):419-441.
- Houweling, Henk, and Jan G. Siccama. (1988) Power Transitions as a Cause of War. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 32(1):87-102.
- Mearsheimer, John J. (1990) Back to the Future. *International Security* 15(1):5-56.
- Thompson, William R. Polarity, the Long Cycle, and Global Power Warfare.
- Wagner, R. Harrison. (1994) Peace, War, and the Balance of Power. *American Political Science Review* 88(3):593-607.

**b. Week 8: Bargaining – October 4**

- Fearon, James. (1995) Rationalist Explanations for War. *International Organization* 49(3):379-414.
- Powell, Robert. (2006) War as a Commitment Problem. *International Organization* 60(1):169-203.
- Powell, Robert. (1999) *Bargaining in the Shadow of Power*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, Chapter 3.
- Slantchev, Branislav L. (2003) The Power to Hurt: Costly Conflict with Completely Informed States. *American Political Science Review* 97(1):123-133.
- Arena, Philip, and Scott Wolford. (2012) Arms, Intelligence, and War. *International Studies Quarterly* 56(2):351-365.
- Wolford, Scott, Dan Reiter, and Clifford Carrubba. (2011) Information, Commitment, and War. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 55(4):556-579.
- Glaser, Charles L. (2010) *Rational Theory of International Politics*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, Chapter 3.

*Recommended:*

- Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce. (1985) The War Trap Revisited: A Revised Expected Utility Model. *American Political Science Review* 79(1):156-177.

**c. Week 9: Issue-Based – October 11**

- Hensel, Paul R. (2012) Territory: Geography, Contentious Issues, and World Politics. In Vasquez, John (2012).
- Gibler, Douglas. (2012) The Implications of a Territorial Peace. In Vasquez, John (2012).

- Vasquez, John (2009), Chapters 3-6.
- Owsiak, Andrew P. (2016) Foundations for Integrating the Democratic and Territorial Peace Arguments. *Conflict Management and Peace Science*, forthcoming.
- Clay, K. Chad, and Andrew P. Owsiak. (2016) The Diffusion of International Border Agreements. *Journal of Politics* 78(2):427-442 & online appendix.

*Recommended:*

- Gibler, Douglas M. (2012) *The Territorial Peace*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Hensel, Paul R., Sara McLaughlin Mitchell, Thomas E. Sowers, and Clayton L. Thyne. (2008) Bones of Contention: Comparing Territorial, Maritime, and River Issues. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 52(1):117-143.
- Senese, Paul R., and John A. Vasquez. (2008) *The Steps to War*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

**d. Week 10: Interstate Rivalries – October 18**

- Valeriano, Brandon. (2012) Becoming Rivals: The Process of Rivalry Development. In Vasquez, John (2012).
- Diehl, Paul F., and Gary Goertz. (2012) The Rivalry Process: How Rivalries Are Sustained and Terminated. In Vasquez, John (2012).
- Stinnett, Douglas M., and Paul F. Diehl. (2001) The Path(s) to Rivalry: Behavioral and Structural Explanations of Rivalry Development. *Journal of Politics* 63(3):717-740.
- Maoz, Zeev and Mor, Ben D. (2002) *Bound by Struggle*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, Chapters 2-3.
- Rider, Toby J., and Andrew P. Owsiak (2013) Border Settlement, Commitment Problems, and the Causes of Contiguous Rivalry. *Journal of Peace Research* 52(4):508-521.
- Dreyer, David R. (2010) Issue Conflict Accumulation and the Dynamics of Strategic Rivalry. *International Studies Quarterly* 54(3):779-795.

*Recommended:*

- Diehl, Paul F., and Gary Goertz (2000) *War and Peace in International Rivalry*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- Goertz, Gary, Bradford Jones, and Paul F. Diehl. (2005) Maintenance Processes in International Rivalries. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 49(5):742-769.
- Findley, Michael G., James A. Piazza, and Joseph K. Young. (2012) Games Rivals Play: Terrorism in Rivalries. *Journal of Politics* 74(1):235-248.
- Hensel, Paul R. (1999) An Evolutionary Approach to the Study of Interstate Rivalry. *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 17(2):175-206.
- Mitchell, Sara McLaughlin, and Cameron G. Thies. (2011) Issue Rivalries. *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 28(3):230-260.
- Valeriano, Brandon. (2012) Becoming Rivals: The Process of Rivalry Development. In *What Do We Know about Interstate War?*, edited by John A. Vasquez. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield.

**e. Week 11: Alliances (incl. War Expansion) – October 25**

- Kang, Choong-Nam. (2012) Alliances: Path to Peace or Path to War? In Vasquez, John (2012).



- Walt, Stephen. (1987) *The Origins of Alliances* Ithaca: Cornell University Press, Chapters 2, 5.
- Smith, Alastair. (1995) Alliance Formation and War. *International Studies Quarterly* 39(4):405-425.
- Chiba, Daina, Jesse C. Johnson, and Brett Ashley Leeds. (2015) Careful Commitments: Democratic States and Alliance Design. *Journal of Politics* 77(4): 968-982.
- Kenwick, Michael R., John A. Vasquez, and Matthew A. Powers. (2015) Do Alliances Really Deter? *Journal of Politics* 77(4):943-954.
- Wolford, Scott. (2014) Showing Restraint, Signaling Resolve: Coalitions, Cooperation, and Crisis Bargaining. *American Journal of Political Science* 58(1):144-156.

*Recommended:*

- Vasquez, John (2009), Chapter 7.
- Gartner, Scott S., and Randolph M. Siverson. (1996) War Expansion and War Outcome. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 40(1):4-15.
- Leeds, Brett Ashley. (2003) Do Alliances Deter Aggression? The Influence of Military Alliances on the Initiation of Militarized Interstate Disputes. *American Journal of Political Science* 47(3):427-439.
- Morrow, James D. (1991) Alliances and Asymmetry: An Alternative to the Capability Aggregation Model of Alliances. *American Journal of Political Science* 35(4):904-933.
- Wolford, Scott. (2014) Power, Preferences, and Balancing: The Durability of Coalitions and the Expansion of Conflict. *International Studies Quarterly* 58(1):146-157.
- Zigler, Sean M. (2016) Competitive Alliances and Civil War Recurrence. *International Studies Quarterly* 60(1):24-37.

**f. Week 12: Arms Races & Economics – November 1**

i. Arms Races:

- Sample, Susan G. (2012) Arms Races: A Cause or Symptom? In Vasquez, John (2012).
- Rider, Toby J. (2013) Uncertainty, Salient Stakes, and the Causes of Conventional Arms Races. *International Studies Quarterly* 57(3):580-591.

ii. Economics:

- Barbieri, Katherine. (1996) Economic Interdependence: A Path to Peace or a Source of Interstate Conflict? *Journal of Peace Research* 33(1):29-49.
- Crescenzi, Mark J.C. (2003) Economic Exit, Interdependence, and Conflict. *Journal of Politics* 65(3):809-832.
- Gartzke, Erik. (2007) The Capitalist Peace. *American Journal of Political Science* 51(1):166-191.
- Simmons, Beth A. (2005) Rules over Real Estate: Trade, Territorial Conflict, and International Borders as Institutions. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 49(6):823-848.

*Recommended:*

- Barbieri, Katherine, and Jack S. Levy. (1999) Sleeping with the Enemy: The Impact of War on Trade. *Journal of Peace Research* 36(4):463-479.
- Glaser, Charles. (2000) The Causes and Consequences of Arms Races. *Annual Review of Political Science* 2:251-276.

## VII. Domestic Theories

### a. Week 13: Regime Type, Leader Turnover, and Diversionary War – November 8

- Most and Starr, Chapter 5.
- Mitchell, Sara McLaughlin. (2012) Norms and the Democratic Peace. In Vasquez, John (2012).
- Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, James D. Morrow, Randolph M. Siverson, and Alastair Smith. (1999) An Institutional Explanation of the Democratic Peace. *American Political Science Review* 93(4):791-807.
- Peceny, Mark, Caroline C. Beer, and Shannon Sanchez-Terry. (2002) Dictatorial Peace? *American Political Science Review* 96(1):15-26.
- Colgan, Jeff D., and Jessica L.P. Weeks. (2015) Revolution, Personalist Dictators, and International Conflict. *International Organization* 69(1):163-194.
- Prorok, Alyssa K. (2016) Leader Incentives and Civil War Outcomes. *American Journal of Political Science* 60(1):70-84.
- Debs, Alexandre, and Jessica C. Weiss. (2016) Circumstances, Domestic Audiences, and Reputational Incentives in International Crisis Bargaining. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 60(3):403-433.

#### *Recommended:*

- Chiozza, Giacomo, and H.E. Goemans. (2011) *Leaders and International Conflict*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Huth, Paul K., and Todd L. Allee. (2002) *The Democratic Peace and Territorial Conflict in the Twentieth Century*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Kurizaki, Shuhei, and Taehee Whang. (2015) Detecting Audiences Costs in International Disputes. *International Organization* 69(4):949-980.
- Maoz, Zeev, and Bruce Russett. (1993) Normative and Structural Causes of the Democratic Peace, 1946-1986. *American Political Science Review* 87(3):624-638.
- Mitchell, Sara McLaughlin, and Brandon C. Prins. (2004) Rivalry and Diversionary Uses of Force. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 48(6):937-961.
- Rosato, Sebastian. (2003) The Flawed Logic of Democratic Peace Theory. *American Political Science Review* 97(4):585-602.
- Russett, Bruce, and John Oneal. (2001) *Triangulating Peace*. New York: W.W. Norton.
- Wolford, Scott. (2012) Incumbents, Successors, and Crisis Bargaining: Leadership Turnover as a Commitment Problem. *Journal of Peace Research* 49(4):517-530.

## VIII. Week 14: Individual and Psychological Theories – November 15

- Rosen, All.
- Mintz, Alex. (2004) How Do Leaders Make Decisions? A Polyheuristic Perspective. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 48(1):3-13.
- Jervis, Robert. (1988) War and Misperception. *Journal of Interdisciplinary History* 18(4):675-700.
- Waite, Robert. (1990) Leadership Pathologies: The Kaiser and the Fuhrer and the Decisions for War in 1914 and 1939. In *Psychological Dimensions of War*, edited by Betty Glad. Newbury Park, CA: Sage, Chapter 6.
- Caprioli, Mary, and Mark A. Boyer. (2001) Gender, Violence, and International Crisis. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 45(4):503-518.

*Recommended:*

- Basedau, Matthias, Birte Pfeiffer, and Johannes Vullers. (2016) Bad Religion? Religion, Collective Action, and the Onset of Armed Conflict in Developing Countries. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 60(2):226-255.
- Gat, Azar. (2009) So Why Do People Fight? Evolutionary Theory and the Causes of War. *European Journal of International Relations* 15(4):571-599.
- Levy, Jack S. (1997) Prospect Theory, Rational Choice, and International Relations. *International Studies Quarterly* 41(1):87-112.
- Mousseau, Michael. (2012) A Market-Capitalist or Democratic Peace? In Vasquez, John (2012).
- Stern, Eric. (2004) Contextualizing and Critiquing the Poliheuristic Theory. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 48(1):105-126.
- Tickner, Ann J. (2001) *Gendering World Politics*. New York: Columbia University Press, Chapter 2.

**IX. EXTRA: Deterrence**

- Benson, Brett V. (2012) ATOP Data and Deterrence. In Vasquez, John (2012).
- Geller, Daniel S. (2012) Nuclear Weapons and War. In Vasquez, John (2012).
- Huth, Paul K., and Bruce Russett. (1984) What Makes Deterrence Work? Cases from 1900-1980. *World Politics* 36(4):496-526.
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**X. Week 15: Future Directions and Conclusion – November 29**

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