

INTL 4710: Model United Nations Practicum

University of Georgia, Department of International Affairs

Course Instructor Information:

Dr. Andrew Owsiak
Email: aowskiak@uga.edu
Office: 325 Candler Hall
Office Hours: 1:00-3:00pm Wednesday
(or by appointment)

Course Meeting Information:

Spring 2014
Weds., 5:45-8:45pm
214 Candler Hall
<https://www.elcnew.uga.edu>

Course Description:

Why do multilateral negotiations occur, and how do they proceed? The current course investigates these two broad questions as it prepares students for a Model United Nations competition. We begin by considering what bargaining is, why state actors (especially powerful states) bargain with each other, and why they would use international organizations (of any kind) as a forum through which to address their concerns. Then, we briefly explore the strategies and components of effective bargaining – to prepare students more fully for their competition. With this foundation in place, we next recognize that bargaining (especially in the international arena) is not easy and therefore examine a number of factors that complicate effective international bargaining. These complications include the choice of a bargaining forum (and, perhaps, disagreement about the best forum to use), misperception, multilateral (as opposed to bilateral) bargaining, domestic audiences, enforcement concerns, imperfect information, and deception. For each obstacle, we identify the problem and seek potential solutions to help states overcome it. Finally, as the course concludes, we entertain the possibility that third-parties (through, for example, mediation) might help actors achieve bargaining success.

Because the course is designed as a Model United Nations Practicum, it possesses two unique characteristics. First, we give the United Nations special, though not exclusive, consideration throughout the course. This means that we look briefly at the United Nation's organization, purpose, and decision-making structure, as well as how states use it (or not). We also relate bargaining strategies and obstacles to the United Nations where we can. Second, the course offers students multiple opportunities to hone their Model United Nations skills. Assignments are designed specifically (where possible) to help students prepare for their competition. Furthermore, students participate in instructor-led and student-led simulations throughout the course, during which they can practice their bargaining skills and experience bargaining obstacles directly.

Course Objectives:

Upon completion of this course, a student should be able to:

- Explain the benefits of and limitations to international cooperation;
- Understand various practical techniques for bargaining and appreciate the conditions under which they might be of use when bargaining;
- Explain numerous bargaining obstacles, as well as how they might be overcome;
- Describe how the United Nations can facilitate (or impede bargaining);
- Write a clear, concise (Model United Nations) position paper;
- Analyze and respond (better) to oral arguments quickly;
- Develop and describe their own bargaining style (for use in competition or other arenas).

Course Reading Material:

In order for the course to function smoothly, you should complete all assigned readings *before* the class meeting for which they are assigned. Completing these readings (and attending class consistently) will best help students be successful in the course. Students are responsible for all assigned readings, even if the material is not explicitly discussed in the classroom. Please note that the instructor reserves the right to replace part of the participation grade with unannounced quizzes if students are not completing the readings and contributing to class discussions.

The required textbooks for the course are:

- Fisher, Roger, William Ury, and Bruce Patton. (2011) *Getting to Yes*, revd edn. New York: Penguin.
- Starkey, Brigid, Mark A. Boyer, and Jonathan Wilkenfeld. (2010) *International Negotiation in a Complex World*, 3rd edn. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield.
- Weiss, Thomas G., David P. Forsythe, Roger A. Coate, and Kelly Kate Pease. (2014) *The United Nations and Changing World Politics*, 7th edn. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

All assigned readings beyond the required textbook will be made available electronically from the instructor. They can be accessed through the course (*new*) eLearning Commons (eLC) website (log-in using UGA MyID at: <https://www.elcnew.uga.edu>).

Limitations and Disclaimers:

A primary purpose of this course is to prepare Model United Nations students for their competition. These students will therefore receive priority when registering for this course. Students not currently involved in Model United Nations *may* be admitted to the course upon the approval of the instructor. Admission will depend both upon the number of students enrolled in the course, the fit between the course objectives and the student's interests/goals, and the student's commitment to being an active participant in the course exercises.

Note: the Model United Nations club is a student run organization, which operates independently of the class. Admission to the course therefore does not constitute admission to the club. The instructor does not participate in the interview or selection of potential club team members. Please visit the club website for details about its membership, mission, and activities: <http://modelun.uga.edu/Home.html>.

Course Requirements:

The following are the requirements for this course:

1. Participation (20%): Participation grades will be calculated based upon the system outlined under the Course Guidelines section. Generally speaking, those wishing to do well on this component of the course should: a) attend class meetings, b) contribute meaningfully to class discussions (quality and quantity), and c) participate actively during in-class activities. For simulation participation, the instructor will also solicit feedback from those in the class (since the instructor may not see all parts of the simulation proceedings). Students should prepare for each class meeting by completing assigned readings, generating questions they have from those readings, and reviewing notes from previous meetings. Any quizzes (see above) fall within this category as well.
2. Simulation Facilitation (15%): Students will work in teams to plan a short in-class simulation for their classmates. They are responsible for: a) selecting the topic, b) creating the simulation environment/conditions, c) preparing any materials needed by participants, and d) leading a short debriefing conversation after the simulation. Student groups should consult the instructor as they prepare. Students will also submit a planning "docket" to the instructor (as a group) at the time of the simulation.
3. Committee Position Paper (10% first draft, 20% second draft): Because the primary purpose of the course is to prepare students for the Model United Nations conference, students will complete a position paper based on the committees to which the club assigns them for the Emory competition they will attend. The first paper (draft) is due February 19 at 5:45pm. The final draft is due March 26 at 5:45pm.
4. Simulation Reflection (10%): The instructor will run a simulation towards the end of the course. Students will be expected to contribute actively to the exercise (part of participation). After the simulation, students will also reflect upon their experience, guided by questions distributed by the instructor. Students will submit a paper (3-4 page) on April 16, 2013 at 5:45pm that a) addresses the reflection question(s) given, and b) integrates their experience with the course material.

5. Final Exam (cumulative, 25%): Students will take a final exam for the course on April 30 from 7:00-10:00pm (in accordance with the University's exam schedule). The exam will include multiple choice, identification, and/or essay questions. Please bring a blue book. The instructor reserves the right to change the exam format (e.g., to take-home format); if this is done, specific instructions about the exam will be distributed to students in a separate document.

Course Guidelines:

The following guidelines govern the requirements for this course:

1. Students are expected to read the assigned course material, attend all class meetings and participate actively within in-class activities and discussions. There is no "extra credit" to make up for low participation.
2. The class will follow a seminar (i.e., discussion), rather than lecture-based format (though lecture will be used when appropriate). Each class will involve a discussion of the readings assigned for that day (or activities derived from them). Students can gain or lose points during these discussions. To gain points, you must make a positive contribution to the class – such as comments that *meaningfully* criticize or challenge, request clarification of, extend, or react to assigned readings. To lose points, you need only fail to be prepared to contribute when called upon. At the end of the semester, your participation grade will be calculated based on the total number of points you have earned; these convert to grades according to the following scheme – 14+ (A), 10-13 (B), 6-9 (C), 4-5 (D), and less than 4 (F).

I will always allow volunteers to contribute to discussion first, and I prefer to rely upon a voluntary system. If no volunteers are available, however, I will randomly call upon people. Each person will be assigned a number during the first week of the course, and this number corresponds to a poker chip in a bowl. If your chip is drawn, you must answer the question raised. You may pass *once* (in total) in the event you are unprepared or absent for that specific question. After this free pass, I will deduct one point from your total participation score for each time that you are unprepared or absent to answer a question for which your chip is drawn. [Note: chips always return to the bowl after being drawn, so you may be called upon *more than once within a class period*.]

Students may earn a total of two points in any one class period (though they might lose up to two points as well). The instructor's recorded point total will be final at semester's end; it is not subject to negotiation at grading time. In other words, *plan to participate early and often*.

I use this system to incentivize you to complete the readings. Our discussions will rely upon them, as will the exam and paper assignments. It is therefore to your benefit to complete the readings.

3. Students who are unable to attend a class meeting are responsible for obtaining the notes for that meeting from another student. The instructor will not provide lecture slides or notes for class meetings.
4. Assignments and papers are due on the dates given at the *beginning* of the regular class period. A late paper will be docked one full letter grade (10 percentage points) for the first day it is late, as well as an additional letter grade (10 percentage points) for each additional day it is late. After 5 days, assignments can be turned in for half-credit until the final day of class (April 23, 2013 at 5:45pm). Note that I will not accept excuses (for example, broken printers) to justify missing the deadlines. It is also not appropriate to come to class significantly late on the dates on which papers are due; papers turned in after the beginning of class may be penalized.

5. Failure to take an exam will result in a failing grade for the exam. Make-up exams *may* be offered, but only with the prior approval of the instructor (generally for documented, emergency situations). Students are therefore advised to attend all exams. All make-up exams (if granted) will be administered on Tuesday, April 29 from 8-9:15am.
6. Students are advised to keep class notes, graded papers, and copies of submitted work until final grades are distributed. Every effort will be made to ensure that assignments and exams are graded timely, fairly, and objectively. If during the course of the semester, you believe that you received an inaccurate grade, you may submit a written memo to the instructor, along with the graded paper in question. This memo must be submitted within two weeks of receiving the graded assignment and should identify what you believe to be the error and the reason(s) for this belief. The instructor will then read the memo, re-read the paper, and assign a new grade. The new grade may be *lower*, the *same*, or *higher* than the original grade (as I can make errors in both directions) and will not be subject to additional appeal under this policy.
7. In order to foster a respectful learning environment, students are expected to:
 - a. use language that does not insult others or their point of view;
 - b. keep cell phones turned off *and* put away during class; and
 - c. use laptops brought to the classroom *for education purposes only* (e.g., no email, chat, games, etc.).
 Any student that does not follow these parameters may be asked to leave the class meeting so as not to affect other students' learning. Any student that violates this policy more than once may be dropped from the course.
8. It is the policy and practice of the University of Georgia to create an inclusive learning environment. Students requiring accommodations should discuss such matters with the instructor at the outset of the course. Students requesting accommodations must register with the Disability Resource Center on campus (706-542-8719, <http://www.drc.uga.edu>).
9. Any exceptions or modifications to the above rules (or syllabus) are given at the instructor's discretion, only with prior approval and only under instances of extreme emergency or serious illness. Appropriate documentation must be supplied by the student in any event of exception. (NOTE: In the case of illness, "appropriate documentation" means a doctor's note indicating an illness, rather than a medical visit verification form. Please schedule routine medical visits around the course schedule.)

Grade Distribution

A	93.00-100.00	C	73.00-76.99
A-	90.00-92.99	C-	70.00-72.99
B+	87.00-89.99	D+	67.00-69.99
B	83.00-86.99	D	63.00-66.99
B-	80.00-82.99	D-	60.00-62.99
C+	77.00-79.99	F	Below 60.00

NOTE: Any student that withdraws from the course and is failing the course at the time of withdrawal will be assigned a withdrawal-failing (WF) grade. Any student that does not attend the first week of the course may be administrative dropped from the course.

Academic Dishonesty:

As a University of Georgia student, you have agreed to follow the University's academic honesty policy ("A Culture of Honesty") and the Student Honor Code. All academic work must meet the standards contained in "A Culture of Honesty" (including policies that cover plagiarism; for more information, see <http://www.uga.edu/honesty>). Students are responsible for informing themselves about these standards before performing any academic work and may direct specific questions they have regarding the policy (or its application to course assignments) to the instructor. Please note that all suspected violations of this policy will be handled according to the guidelines set forth within the policy.

Schedule/Topics:

The following pages contain a general plan for the course; deviations announced to the class by the instructor may be necessary (in order to best meet the needs of the students/course). All readings are required unless otherwise noted. Students should read/know required material by the date on which we discuss the related topic in class.

Note: If the schedule changes, the instructor will announce (in class) the dates on which topics will be covered as the course progresses. The exact schedule depends upon the speed with which the course moves.

Schedule:

- I. Introduction (January 8)
 - a. Starkey et al., Chapter 1-2.
 - b. Weiss et al., Introduction.
 - c. *Instructor-led simulation #1.

- II. International Bargaining (January 15)
 - a. How to Think about Bargaining
 - i. Starkey et al., Chapters 3-5.

 - b. Why Do States Bargain with Each Other? (January 15)
 - i. *One of the following:*
 1. Stein, Arthur. (1982) "Coordination and Collaboration: Regimes in an Anarchic World." *International Organization* 36(2):294-324.
 2. Krasner, Stephen D. (1991) "Global Communications and Life on the Pareto Frontier." *World Politics* 43(3):336-366.

 - c. Why Do Powerful States Bargain at All? (January 22)
 - i. *One of the following:*
 1. Ikenberry, John. (2001) *After Victory*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, Chapter 3.
 2. Thompson, Alexander. (2006) "Coercion through IOs: The Security Council and the Logic of Information Transmission." *International Organization* 60(1):1-34.

 - d. Why and How Do States Bargain through International Institutions? (January 22)
 - i. Abbott, Kenneth W., and Duncan Snidal. (1998) "Why States Act through Formal International Organizations." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 42(1):3-32.
 - ii. Hawkins, Darren G., David A. Lake, Daniel L. Nielson, and Michael J. Tierney. (2006) "Delegation Under Anarchy: States, International Organizations, and Principal-Agent Theory." *Delegation and Agency in International Organizations*, edited by Darren G. Hawkins, David A. Lake, Daniel L. Nielson, and Michael J. Tierney. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, Chapter 1.

- e. The United Nations
 - i. Peace and Conflict (January 29)
 - 1. Weiss et al., Chapters 1, 4-5.
 - 2. *Optional*: Weiss et al., Chapters 2-3.
 - ii. Human Rights and Development (February 5)
 - 1. Weiss et al., Chapters 6-7, 10.
 - 2. *Optional*: Weiss et al., Chapters 8-9, 11.
 - 3. [NOTE: The club hosts the high school Model UN tournament at UGA on February 7-9. All club members should plan to assist with this event.]
 - iii. The UN Moving Forward (February 12)
 - 1. Weiss et al., Conclusion.
- f. Can States Use Coercion to Bargain Effectively? If So, How? (February 12)
 - i. Schelling, Thomas. (1966) *Arms and Influence*. New Haven: Yale University Press, Chapter 2.
 - ii. *One of the following*:
 - 1. Gambetta, Diego. (2009) *Codes of the Underworld*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, Chapter 5.
 - 2. Slantchev, Branislav L. (2005) "Military Coercion in Interstate Crises." *American Political Science Review* 99(4):533-547 (if selected, focus on argument, not math).

III. A Practical Guide to Bargaining

- a. How Might We Think about Bargaining? (February 19)
 - i. Starkey et al., Chapter 6.
 - ii. Schelling, Thomas. "Bargaining, Communication, and Limited War." In *The Strategy of Conflict*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, Chapter 3.
 - iii. Hopmann, P. Terrence. (1996) *The Negotiation Process and Resolution of Interstate Conflicts*. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, Chapter 10.
 - iv. *Student Simulation #1.
 - v. **Position Paper Draft Due.**
- b. What Are the Components to an Effective Bargaining Strategy? (February 26)
 - i. Fisher et al., all (especially Chapters 2-6).
 - ii. *Optional*: Ury, William. (2008) *The Power of a Positive No*. New York: Bantam, Chapter 5.
- c. What If Things Do Not Go Exactly According to the Book? How Do We Troubleshoot?
 - i. *Optional*: Fisher et al., Chapters 6-9 & Section V.
- d. How Might We Design "International Agreements"? (March 5)
 - i. Abbott, Kenneth W., Robert O. Keohane, Andrew Moravcsik, Anne-Marie Slaughter, and Duncan Snidal. (2000) "The Concept of Legalization." *International Organization* 54(3):401-419.
 - ii. Guzman, Andrew T. (2005) "The Design of International Agreements." *European Journal of International Law*. 16(4):579-612.
 - iii. Koremenos, Barbara. (2001) "Loosening the Ties that Bind: A Learning Model of Agreement Flexibility." *International Organization* 55(2):289-325.
 - iv. *Student-led simulation #2

- IV. What Are the Factors that Complicate Bargaining? (March 19)
- a. Selection of the Appropriate Forum and Existing Institutional Procedures
 - i. Forum
 1. Busch, Marc L. (2007) "Overlapping Institutions, Forum Shopping, and Dispute Settlement in International Trade." *International Organization* 61(4):735-761.
 - ii. Procedures:
 1. Stiles, Kendall W. (2006) "The Power of Procedure and the Procedures of the Powerful: Anti-Terror Law in the United Nations." *Journal of Peace Research* 43(1):37-54.
 - iii. Case Example with Theory
 1. Chapman, Terrence L., and Dan Reiter. (2004) "The United Nations Security Council and the Rally 'Round the Flag Effect." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 48(6):886-909.
 2. *Optional:* Kagan, Robert. (2004) "America's Crisis of Legitimacy." *Foreign Affairs* 83(2):65-87.
 - iv. *Student-led simulation #3
 - b. Psychological Barriers (March 26)
 - i. Jervis, Robert. (1982) "Deterrence and Perception." *International Security* 7(3):3-30.
 - ii. Levy, Jack S. (2000) "Loss Aversion, Framing Effects, and International Conflict." In *Handbook of War Studies II*, edited by Manus I. Midlarsky. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, pp. 193-221.
 - iii. Mintz, Alex. (1993) "The Decision to Attack Iraq: A Noncompensatory Theory of Decision Making." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 37(4):595-618.
 - iv. *Student-led simulation #4
 - v. **Position paper final draft due**
 - c. Multilateral Negotiations (April 2)
 - i. Hampson, Fen O. (1996) *Multilateral Negotiations*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, Chapter 2.
 - ii. Hopmann, P. Terrence. (1996) *The Negotiation Process and Resolution of International Conflicts*. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, Chapter 13.
 - iii. Walker, Ronald A. (2004) *Multilateral Conferences*. New York: Palgrave, Chapter 10.
 - iv. Narlikar, Amrita, and Pieter van Houten. (2012) "Know the Enemy: Uncertainty and Deadlock in the WTO." In *Deadlocks in Multilateral Negotiations: Causes and Solutions*, edited by Amrita Narlikar. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, Chapter 6.
 - d. *Instructor-led simulation #2 (April 9)
 - e. Domestic Audiences (April 16)
 - i. *One of the following:*
 1. Putnam, Robert. (1988) "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games." *International Organization* 42(3):427-460.
 2. Dai, Xinyuan. (2002) "Information Systems in Treaty Regimes." *World Politics* 54(4):405-436.
 - ii. **Simulation reflection paper due.**

- f. Enforcement Concerns (April 16)
 - i. *Two of the following*:
 1. Fearon, James. (1998) “Bargaining, Enforcement, and International Cooperation.” *International Organization* 52(2):269-305.
 2. Gartzke, Erik, and Kristian Gleditsch. (2004) “Why Democracies May Actually Be Less Reliable Allies.” *American Journal of Political Science* 48(4):775-795.
 3. Downs, George W., David M. Roache, and Peter N. Barsoom. (1996) “Is the Good News about Compliance Good News about Cooperation?” *International Organization* 50(3):379-406.
 - g. Imperfect Information and Incentives to Misrepresent (April 23)
 - i. *One of the following*:
 1. Fearon, James D. (1995) “Rationalist Explanations for War.” *International Organization* 49(3):379-414.
 2. Richmond, Oliver. (1998) “Devious Objectives and the Disputants’ View of International Mediation: A Theoretical Framework.” *Journal of Peace Research* 35(6):707-722.
- V. What Help Exists When Bargaining? (April 23)
- a. Mediation
 - i. Beardsley, Kyle. (2011) *The Mediation Dilemma*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, Chapter 2.
 - ii. Crocker, Chester A., Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela Aall, eds. (1999) *Herding Cats: Multiparty Mediation in a Complex World*. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, Chapter 2.
- VI. Conclusion (April 23)
- VII. Final Exam: Wed., April 30 from 7-10pm.**
- VIII. Additional Resources (optional readings):
- a. On the United Nations
 - i. Fasulo, Linda. (2009) *An Insider’s Guide to the UN*, 2nd edn. New Haven: Yale University Press.
 - ii. Franda, Marcus. (2009) *The United Nations in the Twenty-First Century: Management and Reform Processes in a Troubled Organization*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
 - iii. Voeten, Erik. (2000) “Clashes in the Assembly.” *International Organization* 54(2):185-215.
 - iv. Weiss, Thomas G. (2009) *What’s Wrong with the United Nations and How to Fix It*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
 - b. On Conflict Management (broadly defined)
 - i. Bercovitch, Jacob, and Richard Jackson. (2009) *Conflict Resolution in the Twenty-first Century*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
 - ii. Crocker, Chester A., Fen O. Hampson, and Pamela Aall, eds. (2007) *Leashing the Dogs of War*. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press.
 - c. On Negotiation (including tactics)
 - i. Coleman, Peter T. (2011) *Five Percent*. New York: Perseus.
 - ii. Pruitt, Dean G., and Peter J. Carnevale. (1993) *Negotiation in Social Conflict*. Pacific Grove, CA: Brooks/Cole Publishing.
 - d. On Third-Party Intervention
 - i. Diehl, Paul F. (2008) *Peace Operations*. Cambridge: Polity.
 - ii. Greig, J. Michael, and Paul F. Diehl. (2012) *International Mediation*. Cambridge: Polity.
 - iii. Moore, Christopher W. (1986) *The Mediation Process*, 2nd edn. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.