### **Online Appendix** "Clearing the Hurdle: Border Settlement and Rivalry Termination"

The following analyses supplement the analysis presented in our article. In general, they offer greater detail about the results that we report, including additional robustness checks. The analyses that follow do not qualify or alter the findings we present within the published manuscript in any way.

Table 1.1. Border Se	ettlement and	Rivalry Onset/Ter	mination		
Unit-of-analysis: Rivalry					
Rivalry	Ν	% Settled	% Unsettled		
Klein, Goertz, & Diehl Rivals					
@ Onset	119	54.62%	45.38%		
@ Termination	86	76.74%	23.26%		
Enduring Rivals					
(a) Onset	49	30.61%	69.39%		
@ Termination	30	66.67%	33.33%		
Strategic Rivals					
@ Onset	93	30.11%	69.89%		
a Termination	69	68.12%	31.88%		

#### 1 Descriptive Statistics Referenced In-Text

#### 2 Additional Modeling and Results

### 2.1 Kaplan-Meier



2.1.1 Klein, Goertz, and Diehl Rivalry Measure





Note: settlem=0 denotes unsettled borders; settlem=1 denotes settled borders.

## 2.1.3 Strategic Rivals Measure



Note: settlem=0 denotes unsettled borders; settlem=1 denotes settled borders.

### 2.2 Survival Curves (Based on Models Presented in Table 1 in text)



2.2.1 Klein, Goertz, and Diehl Measure

Note: settlem=0 denotes unsettled borders; settlem=1 denotes settled borders.

# 2.2.2 Enduring Rivals Measure



Note: settlem=0 denotes unsettled borders; settlem=1 denotes settled borders.



### 2.2.3 Strategic Rivals Measure

Note: settlem=0 denotes unsettled borders; settlem=1 denotes settled borders.

2.3 Adding the Diehl/Goertz Territorial Change Variable to Models (Table 1 in-text)

We omit the Diehl & Goertz (2000) territorial change shock variable from our published models for reasons of potential multicollinearity problems. Diehl and Goertz reveal that such an omission should not cause difficulties for our analysis. They note that this shock variable exerts a minimal influence on rivalries. More specifically, they claim that it affects *only European states* during the periods 1884-1894 and 1956-1962, a *very small subset* of our analysis. Furthermore, it may actually apply only to *major* states in Europe, since the goal is to capture the effects of (de)colonization, and minor states generally did not colonize other parts of the world.

The table below re-runs the models published in Table 1. None of the models are affected by the inclusion of this variable, and the variable is never statistically significant.

Tuble 2.5.1 Replication		ten rennoman enange	variable
	Model 1a	Model 2a	Model 3a
	KGD	Enduring	Strategic
	Haz. Ratio	Haz. Ratio	Hazard Ratio
Settlement	2.463***	2.563**	2.091***
	(0.660)	(1.250)	(0.548)
Joint Democracy	0.642	3.538*	0.918
	(0.322)	(2.374)	(0.490)
Major Power	0.425*	0.210**	0.599
	(0.194)	(0.166)	(0.218)
Joint Alliance	1.505*	1.360	1.250
	(0.376)	(0.726)	(0.350)
Power Parity	0.410**	2.888	0.634
	(0.162)	(2.280)	(0.351)
Civil War	0.589**	0.472	1.356
	(0.156)	(0.233)	(0.346)
World War Shock	1.509	0.763	2.059***
	(0.543)	(0.573)	(0.570)
Cold War Termin.	4.214***	2.247	4.236***
	(1.126)	(1.157)	(1.345)
Major Power	1.678	-	0.411
Distribution	(1.025)		(0.321)
Territorial Change	0.898	1.891	0.668
	(0.500)	(1.502)	(0.433)
Observations	2,349	1,712	3,271
Log-likelihood	-256.780	-66.021	-223.873
Chi(N)	82.53***	26.58***	58.35***

Table 2.3.1 Replication of Table 1 (in text) with Territorial Change Variable

Notes: \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.10

#### 2.3 Robustness Check with Ordinal Variables (from Table 2 in-text)

We checked the robustness of our findings in Table 2 by producing chi-squared and gamma statistics for all categorical variables in that table (an approach to summarizing categorical data that is advanced by, *inter alia*, Knoke, Bohrnstedt, and Mee 2002), as well as the polychoric correlation statistic (for analyzing the correlation between two ordinal variables; see Kolenikov and Angeles 2004). The categorical variables include all of the severity measures under the crisis analysis and one under the MID analysis.<sup>1</sup> The results of this analysis appear in the table below.

	Chi-squared	Gamma	Polychoric
Crises			
Overall use of	10.0846**	-0.3513	-0.3200
violence			
Importance of	12.1694***	-0.3919	-0.3390
violence			
Severity of	12.8563***	-0.3882	-0.3553
violence			
How crisis is	13.3270***	-0.3419	-0.3066
handled			
MIDs			
Highest Action	38.5039***	-0.0137	-0.0011

 Table 2.4.1. Supplemental Analysis of Manuscript Table 2

Notes: \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \*p<0.10. The gamma and polychoric statistic values are bounded between -1 and 1; values closer to zero denote no/less of a relationship between the variables, and the strength of any relationship grows as one moves farther from 0 in either direction.

In every case, the above statistics confirm the results presented within the manuscript. The severity measures for crises each demonstrate a moderate, negative relationship (chisquared, gamma, and polychoric correlations presented above) – suggesting that crisis severity is significantly lower after border settlement (regardless of the severity measure used). Consistent with these points, the manuscript reports a significant difference in means across the pre- and post-border settlement periods, with crisis severity being lower in the post-settlement phase (regardless of the measure used). In contrast, the MID's "highest action" (severity) measure suggests *no* relationship between settlement phase and MID severity (under this measure of severity). The reported gamma (-0.01) is very close to 0, as is the polychoric correlation (-0.001). In the manuscript, we report no significant difference between the pre- and post-settlement phases for this measure of MID severity.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> The Diehl and Goertz (2000) severity measure approaches a continuous variable, which sits along a 200 point scale.

The above analysis gives us greater confidence in the results we report in the manuscript. We ultimately decide to retain the difference in means test in the manuscript text because such a decision greatly simplifies the table and discussion.

#### References

- Diehl, Paul F., and Gary Goertz. 2000. *War and Peace in International Rivalry*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- Kolenikov, Stanislav, and Gustavo Angeles. 2004. "The Use of Discrete Data in PCA: Theory, Simulations, and Applications to Socioeconomic Indices." CPC/MEASURE Working Paper No. WP-04-85. University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill. Available online at: http://www.cpc.unc.edu/measure/publications/wp-04-85.
- Knoke, David, George W. Bohrnstedt, and Alisa Potter Mee. 2002. *Statistics for Social Data Analysis*, 4<sup>th</sup> edn. Belmont, CA: Thompson Wadsworth.